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This paper studies the nature and consequences of competition in R&D and the 
relationship between this form of competition and competition in the product 
market, by focusing on comparisons of speed of research, number of inde- 
pendent research laboratories, and level of risk undertaken. Among the results: 
competition in the current product market reduces the level of innovation 
(relative to monopoly); competition in R&D increases the level of innovation, 
possibly beyond the socially optimal level. Under certain conditions, it pays 
a monopolist to preempt potential competitors, thereby enabling the monopoly 
to persist. Market equilibrium may entail excessively fast research with in- 
sufficient risk-taking. 
1. Introduction 
* In modern capitalist economies competition assumes a variety of forms. 
Not only is there price competition-the concern of much of traditional 
microeconomic theory- but also product competition (Spence, 1976; Dixit and 
Stiglitz, 1977; Salop, 1977). In this paper we shall be concerned with a third 
arena in which competition occurs-in invention and innovation. While in the 
theory of product competition, the set of possible products is fixed and the tech- 
nologies by which each is produced are given, the theory of invention and 
innovation focuses on the development of new products and new techniques of 
production. Theoretical explorations designed to analyze this form of compe- 
tition have so far been very limited, despite the fact that Schumpeter 
described an illuminating vision of such competition in 1947. 
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The traditional models of competitive equilibrium do not address them- 
selves to an environment in which industries experience a "perennial gale of 
creative destruction." In examining such fundamental questions as the rela- 
tionship between market structure and the rate of technological progress, 
traditional models employ assumptions (such as convexity of the technology) 
which will never be satisfied if there are R&D expenditures.' 
Since the writings of Schumpeter, explorations in the relationship between 
the structure of an industry and R&D activity in the industry have, in large 
measure, been confined to the influence of the degree of concentration on R&D 
expenditure. The empirical literature, which has been surveyed admirably in 
Scherer (1970) and Kamien and Schwartz (1975), has, for the most part, explored 
a causal connection between the degree of concentration and R&D effort. For 
the short run it is, of course, eminently sensible to treat the degree of 
concentration as a datum and therefore to seek a causal connection. But in 
the long run the structure of a given industry must itself be endogenous, 
and while one expects a relationship between R&D expenditure and industrial 
structure, presumably they depend on more basic ingredients, such as the 
technology of research, demand conditions, and the nature of the capital 
market.2 Recent simulation studies by Nelson and Winter (1975) are in this spirit. 
Any attempt at relating industrial structure and R&D expenditure to such 
ingredients requires one to analyze not merely the form of competition in the 
product market, but also the form of competition in R&D. And this suggests 
that while competition in R&D will not be associated with perfect competition- 
a point which was stressed most forcefully by Schumpeter-it must be distinct 
as well from conventional monopolistic competition. In the theory of monop- 
olistic competition the market power of a given firm is limited by the existence 
of close, but imperfect, substitutes. By contrast, in the environment we are 
concerned with here, a firm producing a commodity may, for example, face 
no effective competition at a given moment of time. This may, for example, 
result because the firm enjoys a patent on the technology for producing 
the commodity for whose development it had incurred costs in the past.3 But 
other firms now compete to share the market in the future by undertaking R&D 
expenditure, while the original firm continues to engage in R&D activity lest 
its monopoly position be eroded. In such an environment the central form 
of competition is R&D.4 
1 See Stiglitz (forthcoming) for an extensive discussion of the characteristics of knowledge 
which make the conventional assumptions for the production of ordinary commodities inappli- 
cable to R&D. See also Dasgupta and Heal (1971). 
2 A more complete theory would, of course, endogenize even demand conditions, as has 
been urged most recently by Galbraith (1973). 
3 It is important to observe, however, that even in the short run, when a single firm has a 
monopoly on the existing technology, the traditional model of the profit-maximizing monopolist 
may be inapplicable in the presence of R&D competition; for his actions today (with respect 
to sales, capacity, etc.) may have important entry deterring effects which he will take into account. 
See, e.g., Dasgupta, Gilbert, and Stiglitz (1979), Gilbert and Stiglitz (1979), Spence (1977), 
Salop (1979). 
4 It is competition in R&D activity which is the missing item in the influential article 
by Arrow (1962). Arrow was concerned with comparing the incentives that firms have for under- 
taking R&D expenditure under different market structures. In the formal models that were 
developed in this article, the structure of the product market was varied, but it was supposed 
throughout that only one firm was engaged in R&D activity and that it is protected by barriers 
to entry in this activity. Arrow's formal model therefore eschewed competition in R&D. 
In Section 3 we shall present a formal model of an environment just described in the text. 
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Our concern in this and an earlier paper (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980) 
has been to analyze the relationship between industrial structure and 
various characteristics of R&D activity. In Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) it was 
noted in the context of a model of process innovation that as long as industrial 
concentration is not too great in market equilibrium, there is a positive associa- 
tion between industrial R&D expenditure and the degree of concentration-an 
association that has usually been given a causal interpretation in the empirical 
literature (Scherer, 1970). We noted as well that there is some presumption of 
excessive duplication of R&D activity in a market economy in the sense that 
while each firm undertakes less than the socially optimal level of R&D activity, 
market equilibrium sustains an unwarranted number of firms, so that industry- 
wide R&D expenditure is excessive. In this paper we shall be concerned with 
two additional issues: the speed with which R&D occurs and the extent to which 
risk is undertaken in a market economy. 
We conduct our analysis in the context of two polar cases. The first 
(Section 3) supposes that the uncertainties faced by different research units 
are perfectly correlated in a sense that will be made precise below. The second 
(Sections 4 and 5) supposes that the uncertainties are completely independent 
of one another. These two hypotheses lead to totally different consequences 
on the number of units engaged in R&D. The model to be analyzed in Section 4 
is relatively simple. The stochastic process characterizing the R&D technology 
is assumed to be a Poisson one. This facilitates analysis greatly. But the 
limitations of the Poisson process for analyzing the degree of risk-taking are 
obvious. Consequently, in Section 5 we postulate a general diffusion process 
and obtain some partial answers to the questions asked. 
Our reason for concentrating our attention on these two polar cases is that 
they provide the simplest background for analyzing the critical role that is 
played by the set of available research strategies on the nature of the market 
equilibrium which emerges. In a more general model, the degree of correlation 
between research strategies would itself be endogenous, and one might then ask 
whether a market economy engages in sufficient diversification of research 
strategies or whether firms imitate one another unduly. It will be noted that there 
is a strong parallel between monopolistic competition in product space (i.e., 
product differentiation) and competition in the space of research strategies. 
We are aware, of course, that the concept of pure process innovation 
on which we focus here is itself an idealized construct; industrial innovations 
are a mixture of product and process innovations. What we have in mind are 
innovations that frequently occur in the manufacture of commercial aircraft 
and on occasion in the fields of electronics and photographic equipment, where 
it may not be unreasonable to ignore the issue of product differentiation. There 
is no question, though, that a more complete theory must address itself to the 
mix of product and process innovation and its relationship to the structure 
of an industry. 
2. A preliminary result 
* The analysis that follows is partial equilibrium in nature. We consider the 
market for a given commodity. If Q is the total output, u(Q) is the social 
utility. We suppose u'(Q) > 0 and u"(Q) < 0. Consumer willingness to pay 
(equal to the market price) is by assumption 
p(Q) = u'(Q). (1) 
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If c is the unit cost of production associated with the current best-practice 
technique, then current net social surplus is 
s(c) = max u(Q) - cQ. {QI 
We denote the value of Q which maximizes social welfare when costs are 
c as Q,(c). Suppose that an innovation occurs which reduces the unit cost of 
production from c to cO. If the market is socially managed, then the gain 
in net social surplus per period is 
Ts= s(c*) - s(c) 
(CO S rc 2 
- | -dc = | Qs(c)dc. (2) 
O9c 
ITS is the flow of "social profits" from the invention. We can define 
Vs = Vs Ir 
as the present discounted value of social profits, where r is the (social) rate 
of discount. Note that implicitly in the analysis, we have assumed that there are 
no durable capital goods; introducing these would complicate the analysis, but 
would not change any of the qualitative results. 
We also assume that the present invention will not be replaced by a subse- 
quent invention. This is obviously an unattractive assumption; again, it can be 
removed, but at the expense of some complication to the analysis. (See Gilbert 
and Stiglitz (1979), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1977).) 
Suppose next that the industry is controlled by a pure monopolist 
(i.e., there are high barriers to entry). We assume that net marginal revenue 
is declining in output. When the cost of production is c, the monopolist's 
profit per period is 
P(c) = maxp(Q)Q - cQ. Q 
We denote the monopoly output when costs are c by Qm(c), and the gain in 
the monopolist's profit from lowering costs from c to c* is just 
7Tm = P(C*) -P(c) 3{ J _dc 
rc 
= { Qm(c)dc. (3) 
JC* 
Again, we can define the present discounted value of the increment to monopoly 
profits from the invention as 
Vm = ITmlr. 
We assume a perfect capital market, with the rate of interest faced by firms 
equal to the social rate of discount. 
Thirdly, we consider the case where the present technology is freely avail- 
able, but the inventor of the new technology is awarded a patent on a tech- 
nology for which the cost of production is c. Then, during the length of the 
patent, the profit per period accruing to the patent holder is (letting subscript "e" 
denote the entering firm) 
Te(CA) = max [p(Q)Q - cQ] (4) {QI 
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subject to 
P(Q) ' c. 
When the elasticity of demand for the product is less than unity, the patent 
owner always engages in limit pricing, i.e., p = c. If the elasticity of demand for 
the product is greater than unity, the patent owner may, if c is small enough, 
lower the price. 




e dc = |Qe(c)dc. (5) 
The present discounted value of the invention depends on the length of 
life of the patent, T*: 
Ve = -(1 - e-rT*). (6) 
r 
Still a fourth environment in which we shall be interested is that where the 
present technology (c) is controlled by one monopolist, and the patent is won by 
some other firm. This is perhaps the market environment closest to that which 
Schumpeter had in mind, where one monopolist is succeeded- temporarily- 
by another.5 The market after the invention is then characterized by duopoly, 
and the profits accruing to the winner of the patent will depend on the inter- 
actions between the two duopolists. 
In our later discussion we shall show that we can obtain certain general 
results which are independent of any particular assumptions concerning the 
nature of the interactions between the duopolists. 
In the next section we shall contrast the equilibrium in each of the three 
market situations (a single monopoly, competition in the initial technology, 
monopoly in the patent, monopoly in the initial technology, with a possibly 
different monopolist in the new technology) with the socially optimal pattern 
of R&D. We shall be concerned with the number of research units (firms) 
engaged in R&D activity and with the rate at which the innovation is expected 
to occur. 
Since (gross) payoffs are different under different market arrangements, 
outcomes will be different. The following set of inequalities will prove useful 
in our subsequent analysis: 
7Ts > le 2 Tm, (7) 
or, equivalently, with an infinite lived patent, 
Vs > Ve 2 Vm. (7a) 
The relationship between these variables is depicted in Figure 1. (We postpone 
until Section 3 the presentation of the fundamental inequalities pertaining to the 
duopoly situation.) Inequality (7) follows immediately upon observing that 
for any c, 
Q(c) > Qe(C) 2 Qm(c) 
and by using (2), (3), and (5). 
The fact that social payoffs (vs) exceeded competitive payoffs (Te), which, 
in turn, exceeded monopoly payoffs suggested that in competitive markets there 
5We do not, however, in this paper, characterize the full dynamic model where each 
invention is succeeded by the next. 
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FIGURE 1 
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will be insufficient research, while in monopoly markets there will be even 
less research. (The latter result seems, moreover, to contradict traditional 
Schumpeterian analysis which argued that at least some degree of monopoly 
had a positive effect on R&D.) Such conclusions, however, are at best suspect: 
to assess their validity we shall need to model formal competition in the R&D 
activity itself, and to distinguish between competition in the product market 
and competition in R&D. To this we now turn. 
3. Incentives for innovation under certainty 
* The socially managed market. If a research unit invests x at t = 0, it solves 
the entire set of research problems at T(x),6'7 i.e., it will "make" the invention at 
T(x). We take it that T(x) > 0 for all x ? 0 and that investing more brings 
forward the discovery date. To minimize difficulties with boundary solutions, we 
assume that T(oo) = 0 and T(O) = , but these assumptions may easily be 
dropped. We assume in addition diminishing returns in R&D technology; i.e., 
that T"(x) > 0 (see Figure 2). 
Consider first the socially managed market. It is clear that the social 
planner's problem is: 
maximize (V,e-rT(x) - x). (8) 
x2O 
A glance at (8) shows that the maximum is in general not a concave function, 
despite the assumption of diminishing returns in R&D technology. This is a 
general feature of process innovations. The social optimum is depicted in Figure 3. 
6 The assumption that all potential research units face the same R&D technology is made 
for expositional ease only. See footnote 12. 
7Alternatively, x can be thought of as the present discounted value of inputs along the optimal 
research strategy yielding the invention at date T. When the outcome of the research is stochastic, 
these two are not equivalent, since the input flow will be terminated at the date of discovery; hence, 
input as well as output becomes stochastic. 
For highly applied research such a model is not wildly off the mark. For example, it is 
confidently claimed by experts that the new generation of passenger jets will get going in 1981 
and 1982, that Boeing 767, Airbus A310-200 and Lockheed LIOI 1-400 will roughly have the same 
capacity and flight range, and that they will each cost about one billion to develop. It is the con- 
fidence in the date of delivery which we wish to emphasize here. 
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FIGURE 2 
DIMINISHING RETURNS IN R & D TECHNOLOGY 
T(x) 
Z1 The pure monopolist. It is now easy to compare the social incentives for 
undertaking such an innovation with the incentives that a monopolist possesses 
within a regime where the monopolist is protected by barriers to entry in the 
field of R&D. (In a later subsection we shall analyze the incentives that a 
monopolist has for undertaking R&D expenditure when there are no barriers 
to entry into R&D activity.) The monopolist's problem is: 
maximize (Vme-rT(x) - x). (9) 
x20 
Let xm be the solution of (9). Since V8 > Vm, we may now conclude from (8) and 
(9) that x8 > Xm.8 Thus, the volume of R&D expenditure, and, therefore, the 
speed of research undertaken by a monopolist protected by entry barriers 
in the research sector is less than what is socially desirable. 
Z The competitive market: Introduction. In this and in the following discussion 
we analyze equilibrium in market economies with more than one firm. Since we 




/ ~ ~~~ Ve-rT
X 
X X e-rt 
xm Xs Xe 
8 This, as the reader may verify, is true even when the payoff functions in (8) and (10) 
are not concave in x. 
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a number of different equilibrium concepts present themselves; some of these 
seem more persuasive under one set of conditions, others seem more persuasive 
under other conditions. The purpose of our discussion is not to present a 
definitive analysis, but rather to explore some of what seems to us as the more 
interesting possibilities and the circumstances in which they might arise. Other 
equilibrium concepts are explored in Gilbert and Stiglitz (1979). 
Among the determinants of the structure of the equilibrium, the following 
appear to be important: 
(1) The actions which are available to the firms: In our discussion of Nash 
equilibrium in pure strategies and of an alternative solution below, we assume 
that the firm has a single decision variable, x, while in our discussion of dynamic 
strategies we view firms as having a research program, a sequence of expendi- 
tures at different dates. The actions in later dates may be dependent on earlier 
actions of rivals. Assuming only a single variable greatly simplifies the analysis; 
this assumption would seem most appropriate in situations where a large initial 
commitment is required in the research program or for very short research 
programs. 
(2) The timing of the actions and the information available to each firm about 
the actions taken by other firms: In the model of Nash equilibrium in pure 
strategies, we assume the firms must take actions at the same time; in the 
model of the following subsection we assume that some potential entrants can 
wait until after the monopolist has committed himself to a research strategy (and 
they observe his action) before they commit themselves. 
The information structure available to each firm is particularly critical 
in those cases where there is a research program (a sequence of expenditures), 
since then, if the rival's actions in previous dates are observable, the firm 
can predicate his action on his rival's actions (while, obviously, if they are 
not, he cannot). 
(3) Beliefs about the actions of rivals: The conventional Nash equilibrium 
assumes that each firm believes that the actions of the other firms will be 
unchanged as a result of his action. We explore the Nash equilibrium below. 
It turns out that there does not exist an equilibrium in pure strategies, although 
elsewhere it is shown that there do exist mixed strategy Nash equilibria. 
A quite different-and we think more plausible-set of expectations is 
explored in our discussion of an alternative solution and of dynamic strategies. 
Both of these may be viewed as reaction function equilibria. The particular form 
explored in the next subsection is essentially a variant of the familiar von 
Stackelberg equilibrium. This equilibrium concept is somewhat more persuasive 
where there already is a monopolist within the industry than it is in those 
situations where there appears to be more symmetry. 
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. We turn first to the case where no one 
owns the patent on the c technology. We therefore assume that the commodity 
is currently marketed at the price c. There is free entry into R&D activity. 
We assume a large number of firms with the same R&D function. (This 
assumption is critical, particularly for the results of the next subsection; it 
implies there are no inframarginal firms, and no profits (rents).) The first firm 
to make the invention is awarded a patent of duration T*. If there are joint 
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winners, they are expected to share the market for the duration of the patent 
(perhaps by playing a Cournot game with one another).9 
In this section, we assume firms must make a single decision, the level 
of x, simultaneously at time 0. To have an interesting problem let us rule out 
the possibility of an equilibrium in which no firm engages in R&D activity, i.e., 
we assume there exists a positive x such that Vee-rT(x) - x > 0. (See Figure 3.) 
We first analyze the competitive market on the supposition that all firms 
(whether or not undertaking R&D) entertain Cournot conjectures regarding the 
level of R&D expenditures of one another. Note first that no more than one firm 
will be engaged in R&D. To confirm this suppose that more than one firm were 
to undertake R&D activity at a potential equilibrium. Clearly any firm that does 
not win a patent is taking a loss, and is thus not profit maximizing: a firm is 
allowed to shut down. Assume two firms tied; then on the assumption that none 
of the others alters its R&D expenditure, either of the firms could choose to 
increase its R&D expenditure marginally, bring forward its date of invention 
marginally, and thereby ensure that it does not have to share the patent with 
any other firm and so increase the present value of its profits by a discrete 
amount. We conclude that if an equilibrium exists, it must sustain precisely 
one firm.10 
We next note that at an equilibrium (if it exists) this firm cannot enjoy a 
positive present value of profits. For, with free entry, a potential entrant, 
entertaining Cournot conjectures about this firm, could choose a marginally 
higher level of R&D expenditure and thereby ensure the patent solely for itself 
and earn a positive present value of profit flow. This suggests that an equilibrium 
is characterized by a single active firm incurring R&D expenditure, xe, which is 
the largest solution of the zero-profit condition 
Vee-rT(x) = X,11 (10) 
(see Figure 3). But if all firms entertain Cournot conjectures regarding the level 
of R&D activity of all other firms, this cannot be, for this single firm can argue 
that on the assumption that all other firms refrain from spending on R&D, it 
could increase the present value of its profit by reducing its R&D expenditure 
from the level xe. We have therefore proved that were all firms to entertain 
Cournot conjectures regarding the level of R&D expenditure of all others, 
a Nash-Cournot equilibrium involving pure strategies does not exist. There 
may, of course, exist an equilibrium involving mixed strategies; we do not 
pursue this line of development here (see Gilbert and Stiglitz (1979)). 
An alternative solution. The implication of the foregoing result appears to be 
that the idea that active firms entertain Cournot conjectures about potential 
entrants is not consistent with the Schumpeterian idea of competition. This 
latter has to do with the threat of entry. The way to capture this is to suppose 
9 As we have postulated a single invention, the assumption of the winner's taking all (during 
the lifetime of the patent) makes most sense. In practice, of course, firms attempt to invent around 
patents so that the first firm to invent is not necessarily the most advantaged. It is clear how 
the model can be extended to incorporate such features. 
"0 We have already ruled out, by construction, an equilibrium devoid of any R&D activity. 
11 The reader can readily verify that there is a largest solution of (10), and also why this is 
the only candidate for equilibrium R&D expenditure. 
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that active firms work on the reaction function of potential entrants; i.e., 
entertain von Stackelberg conjectures regarding their behavior. With this re- 
formulation it is clear that a Cournot-Nash equilibrium exists, that it is 
unique, and that it is characterized by a single firm undertaking R&D expenditure 
at the level xe, which is the largest solution of the zero-profit condition (10).12 
This solution is particularly plausible if we postulate that potential entrants 
can make their R&D commitment sequentially (i.e., that they do not have to 
make their decisions simultaneously), and any firm's decision onx (forx > 0) is 
unalterable (alterable only at great cost). Moreover, any firm's actions are 
observable by all other firms. Then, since we assume that there are a large 
number of firms who have access to the same R&D technology, it is implausible 
that there be significant positive profits and some firm not take advantage of 
the opportunity. Moreover, it is implausible that firms do not recognize this, 
and hence, if they engage in R&D, they will do it at an intensity which deters 
anyone else from entering and undercutting them.13 
An immediate corollary of this analysis combined with (7) is that competi- 
tion may either lead to more or less R&D expenditure than in the socially 
optimal or monopoly allocations. 
There are three factors determining the relative magnitudes ofxe, xs, andxm: 
(1) While the socially optimal and monopoly allocations require equating 
marginal returns to marginal costs, in the competition for entry allocation, 
average revenue is equated to average costs. Since average revenues exceed 
marginal revenues, this leads to a bias for excess expenditures on R&D. 
(2) The longer the life of the patent, the greater is xe. Obviously, as 
T* >0, Xe >0. 
(3) The greater the ratio of Vs/Ve(Ve/Vm), the more likely is Xe < Xs(Xe > Xm). 
The ratio of 1T8 7Te depends on the shape of the demand function. For simplicity, 
we focus on constant elasticity demand functions, of the form 
p = Q-l/IE (11) 
which is derived from the utility function 
Q i-l/e 
U = - l/E (12) 
Then, without loss of generality, we let c = 1, and 
*e= - 1 (13a) 
12 It is clear how the analysis would run if different firms face different technologies of 
research. To take only one example, suppose there is a continuum of potential firms, i, (0 c i c 1), 
such that TI(x) is the date of invention by i if x is its R&D expenditure. Suppose Ti(x) > Tj(x) 
for all x 2 0 and all i and j such that i > j. Then clearly i = 0 is the most efficient firm, and 
it is only this firm which engages in R&D. Its present value of profits in equilibrium is nil though. 
There would appear to be empirical correlates of this as well. McDonnell-Douglas, for example, 
has only recently decided to scrap its plans for developing its DC-X-200, which would have 
competed directly with Boeing's 767. 
13 This argument clearly extends to the environment of (11), when there is a monopolist 
in the c technology. There is a natural assumption that this monopolist is in a position to make 
the first move, and hence to maintain his monopoly. 
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Tre = (1 - c*) provided E < 1 or E > 1 and c* is not too small, 
c* e -1 
= C of E > 1 and c* is small, and (13b) 
EE(E - 1)1-E 
l7Tr C -1 (defined only for E > 1). (13c) 
EE(E -1)1E 
Hence, provided E < 1 or E > 1 and c* is not too small, 
ITe (1 - c*)(E - 1) (14) 
ITs c*l- 1 
while 
7Te C*lE E i 
- = *1-e _ 1(E e (15) 
Thus, for E < 1, for any given invention, 7TeIirs decreases with E, while i1reli1rs i
smaller for large inventions (small c*). 
It thus appears that, ceteris paribus, more elastic demand curves are 
likely to be associated with excessive research in the competitive market, while 
there will be inadequate research for "big innovations." The excessive R&D 
expenditure in the market economy does not stem from a duplication of research 
effort, but rather arises from the pressure of competition. Competition forces 
the single firm to innovate earlier than is socially desirable. 
The foregoing characterization of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium with free 
entry-only a single firm engages in R&D and it makes zero (expected) 
profits-survives if we introduce uncertainty in the date of invention in the 
special form where there is a single research strategy available to all firms (so 
that all firms are obliged to follow the same decision tree) and where the 
uncertainties are all perfectly correlated. This means that, given the pace of 
R&D effort of the remaining firms, a particular firm can guarantee that it is 
the first to invent by choosing a sufficiently high pace of research, even though 
it is unable to say at what date its research unit will complete the sequence of 
tasks. With this form of uncertainty it is immediate that precisely one firm 
will incur R&D expenditure at an equilibrium and, if firms are risk neutral, it 
is the expected present value of its profits which is nil. 
The foregoing result is of importance because it tells us that the number of 
firms actually engaged in a particular R&D activity is not an index for the 
degree of competition. For the model at hand, competition is intense although 
only one firm is active, but it is engaged at a level high enough to forestall entry. 
Dynamic strategies. The previous discussion allowed each firm to commit itself 
to only a single decision variable, x. As we remarked earlier, however, most 
R&D programs extend over a number of periods. At time 0, the firm does not 
have to commit itself for its entire research program. This means that if the 
actions of its rivals are observable, it can predicate its actions on the prior actions 
of its rivals. 
Assume firms are allowed to "move" sequentially. Suppose that a single 
firm were chosen randomly to make the first move. We suppose, moreover, 
that if a firm is a monopolist, it will spend a small amount of resources on 
R&D in the first period. 
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That is, if x(t) is the firm's research intensity at time t, c(x) is the cost (in 
present discounted value terms) of the research program {x(t)}, and we now 
view the date of discovery as a function of the entire program, the firm's 
optimal R&D expenditure is that {x} which maximizes 
V,e-rT(x) - C(X). (16) 
We postulate that the optimal solution involves a strictly positive x during the 
first period. Suppose now the firm does this and then announces that if any 
other firm attempts to compete, it will choose a research strategy which would 
guarantee for itself the patent (if the rival restricts himself to research 
strategies involving nonnegative profits). Clearly, if all firms face the same 
innovation cost function, then any policy which would break even for a potential 
rival would break even for the firm in question; and indeed such a strategy would 
be optimal for the firm, since it serves to deter entry completely. But if no other 
firm attempts to compete, the firm in question quite naturally chooses the 
monopolist's policy. 
Let T(xmc) (for "monopoly-competition") be the solution of (16). A com- 
parison of (8) with (16) shows at once if TP is large enough, T(xmc) > T(xs). It is 
in such environments that one is entitled to claim that the incentive to invent 
under competitive conditions is less than is socially desirable (Arrow, 1962, 
p. 152). What we have shown is that if firms are not compelled to commit their 
R&D expenditure, a given firm may be able to deter entry effectively and still 
behave as a monopolist in R&D, even when there is freedom of entry." 
This equilibrium can also be viewed as a Nash equilibrium: given the 
first firm's announced strategy, it does not pay any firm to enter; and given 
that no other firm enters, it is optimal for it to pursue a monopolist's research 
program.15 
El Duopoly and persistent monopoly. In the previous discussions we have 
analyzed two market situations. In the first case, a single firm controls the 
present technology, and the same firm is the only one allowed (or able) to 
engage in research. In the second case, the present technology is freely 
available, and there are many firms capable of engaging in research. The 
14 Consider, for instance, a two-stage research program. Let S{x(t)} be the set of zero-profit 
research strategies, i.e., 
V e-T*1,() =cQ(t) x(2)). 
Let x,(1) be the monopoly allocation in the first period. Let i,,(2) be the value of x(2), given 
x,(1), which would lead the first entrant just to break even, treating x,..(1) as a bygone, i.e., 
V,e -r(T(xM(1 )_jm(2 ))-1 ) = yCm(2) . 
We postulate that T(xm(1)J,m(2)) < T(x(1),(2)) for all x(1),J(2)ES (i.e., which break even). Clearly, 
this need not be the case; if it is not, an effective entry-deterring strategy by the first entrant will 
require x(1) > x,,(1); but there will still be positive profits associated with the entry-deterring strategy. 
If, however, the rivals can take actions unobserved by the "leader," then he may not be able 
to pursue a policy of "matching" his rivals before they overtake him. The nature of the 
equilibrium in this case is analyzed in Gilbert and Stiglitz (1979). 
15 Indeed, it is even a perfect Nash equilibrium, if entrants are restricted to strategies 
involving research programs for which 
V e-rT(x) 2 C(X). 
DASGUPTA AND STIGLITZ / 13 
"winner" of the research contest will, of course, enjoy a (perhaps temporary) 
monopoly on the new technology. 
This subsection is concerned with a third market environment in which the 
present technology (c) is controlled by a patent, but there is free competition 
in R&D. 
Assume first that the present monopolist cannot (for legal or technological 
reasons) engage in research. As we noted in Section 2, after the invention, 
the market will be a duopoly. Let ie and im denote the entrant's and 
the (original) monopolist's flow of profits after the invention, and Vd and Vd the 
present discounted flow of profits (valued as of the date of invention). The 
profits of the successful entrant in the duopoly situation will normally exceed 
those where there are a large number of competitors. (If the postentry market 
is described by a quantity-setting Nash equilibrium, this is clearly true.) 
Thus, normally, 
Ve > Ve* (17) 
Free entry into the R&D activity, however, entails zero profits: 
Vee rT(xd) = Xd (18) 
Comparing (10) with (18) and using (17), we immediately see that 
Xd > Xe. 
The amount of research is higher if the original market is controlled by a 
monopoly than if it is competitively controlled. (It is in this sense that monopoly 
does encourage R&D.) 
It follows that, since Xe may be greater thanx8, there may well be excessive 
expenditures on R&D: effectively, all potential monopoly profits are dissipated 
in the race to be first. 
We now turn to the case where the monopolist is allowed to engage in R&D. 
We now show that the existing monopolist will prevent potential competitors 
from entering by spending a sufficiently large amount on R&D, thereby 
guaranteeing the new patent for itself.16 Nevertheless, it can be shown that 
the monopolist earns supernormal profits; moreover, it may engage in a speed of 
research greater than what is socially optimal. To see this, denote the 
(maximal) flow of profits to the monopolist after the invention by 
7Tm(C*) = maxp(Q)Q - c*Q, 
Q 
and let Vm(c*) be its present discounted value (valued from the date of the inven- 
tion). Then, since the duopolists will not, in general, engage in joint profit- 
maximizing activity, 
Vm(c*) > Vd + Vd. (19) 
Since no competitor will choose a level of R&D in excess of xd (defined 
in equation (18)), by spending even marginally in excess of Xd, the monopolist 
can guarantee the patent for itself. The present value of profits of the monopolist, 
if it does this, is 
16 This has been noted in the context of natural resources by Dasgupta, Gilbert and Stiglitz 
(1979), and a more general version has been obtained in Gilbert and Newbery (1979). For a 
survey of these models, see Salop (1979). 
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7Tm(C)(l - e ) 
Vm,(c*)e-rT ? ______ x > (Vd ? Vd)e-rT 
r 
?(1 - erT)7rm(c) = V -rT + 7Tm(C)(l - e-rT 
r r 
the present value of profits if it does not preempt. (The first inequality follows 
from (19), the next follows by substituting (18).)17 Therefore the monopolist 
will always forestall entry by competitors by spending in excess of xd (perhaps 
only marginally so). 
In the notation used previously, let xm be the profit-maximizing R&D 
expenditure for a monopolist protected by entry barriers in R&D, (i.e., the 
solution of problem (9)). What we have proved is that if xm- ?x, then the fact 
that there is free entry into the research sector makes no difference to our 
earlier conclusions regarding the incentives to innovate on the part of the 
monopolist protected by entry barriers into R&D. But if x,e, < Xd, the fact that 
the monopolist faces R&D competition is of great importance to the outcome. 
The monopolist will spend in excess of xd (perhaps only marginally) to 
forestall entry. The present value of the flow of profits that it earns is, in this case, 
reduced because it has to spend more on R&D than it would ideally have liked 
to spend. But it nevertheless earns supernormal profits. Finally, it will be noted 
that if the socially optimal level of R&D expenditure, xs, is less than Xd, the 
monopolist, in the face of R&D competition, engages in excessive research. 
The reason the monopolist will always preempt potential competitors is 
intuitively clear. If any other firm were to win the patent, the industry would 
be characterized by a duopoly structure. With free entry this duopolist, having 
recognized that it will have to share the market with the existing monopolist, 
would be forced to spend so much as to reduce the present value of the flow of its 
profits to zero, (i.e., set x = Xd). However, the existing monopolist can always 
ensure that it remains a monopolist by spending a little more on R&D than any 
potential competitor would find profitable. The point to note is that it is always 
in the monopolist's interest to do so, because by remaining a monopolist it 
can earn a flow of profit in excess of the sum of the duopolist's profits. 
The argument is of course reinforced if the existing monopolist is more efficient 
than its competitors in R&D activity. The implication of these conclusions is 
that even if there is competition in R&D activity, there are strong tendencies 
for a monopolized industry to remain a monopoly. The fact that the monopolist 
is threatened by potential competitors at most spurs the monopolist to spend 
more on R&D than it would otherwise. But for the model at hand, the industry 
remains a monopoly. 
The solution concept we have used here, parallel to that outlined earlier, 
involved the monopolist's acting as a von Stackelberg leader with a commitment 
to a level of research input x, and zero profits for research entrants. The 
use of a von Stackelberg solution is perhaps persuasive in this context,18 but the 
17 The argument is somewhat more general than we have put it here; we can, for instance, 
allow there to be durable capital goods (in which case, the maximized value of discounted profits 
will not have the simple form assumed in the text) and there can be uncertainty (Gilbert and 
Newbery, 1979); what is crucial, as we note below, is the zero-profit assumption for all entrants. 
18 Gilbert and Stiglitz (1979) have investigated the structure of Nash equilibria (involving 
mixed strategies) for this problem. 
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"commitment" and "zero-profit" assumptions are not so persuasive. When 
these assumptions are dropped, the nature of the solution may be changed 
markedly, e.g., preemption may on the one hand no longer be desirable (Gilbert 
and Stiglitz, 1979)19 or, on the other, may be possible without significantly 
altering its research plan from what it would be as a pure monopolist with no 
threat of competition (as outlined above). 
4. Speed of research under uncertainty 
* Introduction.20 One of the surprising results we observed in the previous 
section was that with a patent system and free entry into the research sector, 
there would, in the absence of uncertainty, be at most one firm engaged in 
research. Moreover, we noted that if firms are compelled to commit their 
R&D expenditure, and if the existing technology is freely available to all, 
the pace of innovation would be such as to make the present value of profits 
precisely zero, and thus deter further entry. This result continues to hold if 
there is uncertainty in the date of success, but if the uncertainties faced by 
all firms are perfectly correlated in the sense made clear earlier. But so long 
as they are not, matters are different. No firm can be sure of winning the patent, 
and hence entry and speed of research are jointly determined to make expected 
profits zero. 
We now assume the date of discovery is random. More precisely, if the 
firm spends at t = 0 an amount x, then the probability that it would succeed in 
making the invention at or before t is 1 - e-X(xi)t, i.e., the probability of making 
the invention in the interval (t, t + At) is just X(x) At. We postulate that X(xi) 
is characterized by an initial range of increasing returns, followed by decreasing 
returns, as depicted in Figure 4. 
19 The argument is simple: assume there is uncertainty about the outcome of research, and 
there are a number of alternative research strategies which different firms can pursue. Moreover, 
assume some firm has a comparative advantage relative to the other entrant (but not necessarily 
relative to the monopolist), so his profits (really rents) are positive, even with the threat of entry. 
Then, to deter entry of this competitor may require a significant increase in research expenditures. 
20 The model formulated in this section was originally contained in Stiglitz (1971), and was 
independently developed by Loury (1979). Loury focuses on the case where V8 = Ve and firms 
take into account the effect of their action on the aggregate distribution of discovery dates. We are 
concerned primarily with the normal case where V3 > Ve. 
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To simplify the analysis suppose all research units follow different research 
strategies, so that the uncertainties faced by different units are independent of 
one another. But we suppose that they are all equally effective. Thus, if xi 
is the amount invested in the ith unit, and if there are n such units, then the 
probability density function of the discovery's being made at t (looked at from 
date t = 0) is given by the exponential form 
fl n 
E (xi) exp[- E (xi)]t. 
i=l ~~~i=l 
The expected date of discovery is X (x3)]-1. 
In the following two subsections we analyze the case in which R&D 
is socially managed and that in which it is undertaken by a monopolist protected 
by barriers to entry. We then study the competitive case and make a comparison. 
O The socially managed economy. As research units are identical, we shall 
treat them identically at the optimum. As before, let V, be the present discounted 
value of the flow of net social benefits from the date the invention is made 
(discounted to the date of discovery). The objective is to maximize the expected 
present value of net social surplus. The planning problem is therefore to choose 
n and x so as to maximize 
00 
Vs {n X(x)e -(nX(x)+r)tdt - nx. (20) 
Assume that n is a continuous variable.21 Choosing n optimally yields the 
first-order condition that 
VsX(x)r (21) 
(nX(x) + r)2 
and choosing x optimally results in22 
VsX'(x)r 1 (22) 
(nX(x) + r)2 
Equations (21) and (22) allow us to determine n and x. Now note that they 
imply immediately that at the optimum 
X'(x) = X(x) (23) 
x 
Let x* be the solution to (23). Hence the optimal level of investment in each 
laboratory, (Figure 4), is independent of the number of firms. Denote by ns the 
optimal number of laboratories, which can be obtained as the solution of (21) 
if we use the value of x* for x in the equation. 
O Pure monopoly. The analysis is identical for the pure monopolist, (i.e., one 
protected by entry barriers), with V1n replacing Vs in (20)-(23). 
21 This can be justified on the assumption that the efficient size, x*, of each research unit, 
is "small. " 
22 (21) and (22) are valid as long as X'(O) > r27r8, which we shall assume as being true. 
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Thus, the monopolist operates each laboratory at the efficient level, but the 
number of laboratories will not be optimal. If nm is the expected profit- 
maximizing number of research units for the monopolist, it is the solution of 
Vm X'(x*)r - 1 (24) 
(nX(x*) + r)2 
Since V8 > Vm, a comparison of equation (22) with (24) tells us that ns > nm . 
The monopolist therefore delays innovation; the expected date of success is 
farther away in the future. This result parallels that obtained in Section 3. 
O The fully competitive market. We turn now to the economy in which 
competitive firms undertake R&D expenditure. Firms (laboratories) are 
identical, and work independently of one another. Let firm i invest xi at t = 0 
and let n be the number of firms investing. Firm i knows this number and the 
choice of xj (j * i). Then, the probability density (viewed at t = 0) that firm 
i will be the winner and that it will invent at t is given as 
- 
X(xj)t 
X(xie J= . (25) 
As earlier we postulate free entry. Thus n is endogenous. As before, we let 
Ve be the present discounted value of the flow of profits (assumed positive 
for T* years, the life of the patent) accruing to thefirst discoverer from the date 
of discovery. Firms are assumed risk-neutral. Hence, firm i wishes to choose 
xi with a view to maximizing 
Ve x A(x-)e(I X(xX) +r)tdt - xi (26) 
There are two routes that one can follow here. One can assume that 
firms are sophisticated calculators and take into account the fact that xi 
influences 1=, X(xj). Alternatively, one can assume that each firm ignores its 
effects on E #=, X(xj), which is to say that it takes the expected date of the 
invention as given and varies xi with a view solely to altering the probability 
that it is the first to make the invention and win the patent. This is plausible 
if the number of firms is "large," which we shall assume to be the case. There- 
fore, the ith firm chooses xi so that23 
X' (xi) Ve =1. (27) 
(E X(xj) + r) j=1 
As we are supposing identical firms, let us look for the symmetric Cournot- 
Nash equilibrium. Thus, (27) becomes 
Ve A(x) 1 (28) (nX(x) + r) 
Moreover, with free entry, the expected present value of profits is nil for 
each firm. Hence, from (26) we get 
23 In arriving at (27) we suppose that X'(O) > riVe. 
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V X(x) 
=X. (29) 
nX(x) + r 
Equations (28) and (29) represent the free-entry Cournot-Nash equilibrium, 
and n and x are determined from them. 
There are two immediate implications of (28) and (29). First, 
X'(x)= -(x) 
x 
Hence, at this equilibrium each firm operates its laboratory efficiently, i.e., 
x = x* (see Figure 4). 
Since the laboratories in each of the three different institutions we are 
studying here are operated at the efficient level, in assessing the speed of 
research in these different economic environments we need only compare the 
number of research units. In particular, the model predicts that the expected 
date of invention 1/nX is simply inversely proportional to the aggregate R&D 
expenditures nx with proportionality constant 1/X'(x*) for all three market 
structures examined. Total R&D expenditure, nx, times the expected date of 
invention is independent of market structure.24 
Moreover, since, if any research is undertaken in the social optimum, 
it is clear that social profits must be positive, 
V,n X > nx. 
nX + r 
With free entry, where V, Ve, there would be an excessive number of firms 
engaged in research. If the receiver of the patent appropriates the entire social 
gain from the research, with free entry, average returns must equal average 
costs, and hence all the potential social gains will be dissipated in the form of 
excessive entry. (This is just another example of a common pool problem; 
each entrant receives either the entire benefit or nothing, but his expected gain 
is just llnth the value of the patent.)25 The ratio of marginal to average returns 
is just rl(nX + r) < 1. 
In general, however, as we have argued, Vs > Ve, and thus, whether there 
is too much or too little research is ambiguous. But at least within the 
confines of our simple model, we can ascertain conditions under which it is 
likely that there will be too little or too much research. 
From equations (21) and (29) one obtains 
ncX(x*) + r Ve(nsX(x*) + r) (30) 
nsX(x*) + r V,r 
24 In a recent study Schwartzman (1977) has suggested that in the pharmaceutical industry the 
average cost per new chemical entity is about $17 million per year, and that on average the discovery 
period is about 4-5 years. Assuming the upper value and ignoring discounting, this means a total 
investment of about $85 million per new chemical entity. In the context of our model this means that 
x/X(x) = ncE(TQ)) = 85 x 5 x 106 
dollar years, and the model says that it is this which is independent of market structure. 
25 This point was originally made in Stiglitz (1971) and Barzel (1968). Loury's analysis 
is confined to this limiting case. 
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Using equation (21) in the right-hand side of (30), we can express the latter 
equation as 
ncX(x*) + r Ve\/(3) 
flsX(X*)?r ~~~~~~~~~ (31) n, X(x *) + r vvs x* r 
We conclude: 
nc ~ ns as Ve 3/ V . (32) 
Relationship (32) is extremely useful. On the one hand, it allows us to 
compute the optimal patent life, 
-lIn I - r }( (33) 
provided 
r 7-sIX'(x*) < Te * (34) 
(If (34) does not hold, then, for an infinite life patent, the market engages 
in an insufficient amount of research.) 
On the other hand, for particular parameterizations it allows us to calculate 
easily whether the market (with a particular patent life) involves an excessive 
amount of research. To illustrate this we focus here on constant elasticity 
demand curves, with elasticity less than unity (so the winner of the patent will 
engage in limit pricing) and an infinite life of a patent. Recall from Section 3 
that, if we let c = 1, 
1 - C*l-e l*1E 7T = 
and 
Te= 1 - C. 
Substituting into (34) and differentiating with respect to c, we see (Figure 5) 
that for small inventions the market always provides inadequate research. 
(Contrast this with the corresponding result in Section 3.) On the other hand, 
at c* = 0, 7rs = 1/1 - E, while 7Tre = 1. Hence, if Te is the expected date of 




for sufficiently long patent lives, the market spends too much on research. 
(Recall that RTe is a constant, independent of market structure.) Thus, for 
sufficiently low interest rates and for sufficiently small elasticities of demand, 
the market will, for long-lived patents, have an excessive number of research 
units. Note that the social waste here does not arise from duplication of 
research effort (as in the earlier study of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980)). 
In the case in which all firms follow the same research strategy, all 
expenditures by more than one firm are wasteful. Here, since each firm has a 
research strategy which is uncorrelated with the others, there is a positive social 
benefit from each additional research unit. The social waste is more subtle: it 
arises from the fact that the marginal social benefit is, under the circumstances 








specified, less than the marginal private benefit-the increased probability of 
winning the patent. 
Note that industries in which the elasticity of demand is low are, ceteris 
paribus, more likely to be characterized by excessive expenditures on R&D. 
Our simple model also allows us to make simple comparative statics 
propositions. We know that an industry in which there is a greater payoff to 
success (i.e., greater value of Ve) will, ceteris paribus, be characterized by 
a larger number of firms' attempting to invent cost-cutting techniques of 
production.26 
If the firm takes cognizance of its effect on the aggregate probability 
distribution of discovery dates, we obtain 
X'Ve 
_ te-(nX+r)tdtl(nX + r)l = 1, 
nX + r I o 
or 
X'Ve 1 
e - ]=- 1. (35) 
nX+r [ nX+rJ 
It immediately follows in this case that each research laboratory will be 
operated at a slower than optimal speed. Note that as n gets large, the scale 
at which each research laboratory operates converges to the efficient level, and 
the analysis above becomes directly applicable. 
Moreover, it also follows from (35) in conjunction with the zero-profit 
constraint (29) that, in the market equilibrium where firms take into account their 
effect on the aggregate probability distribution of discovery date (as compared 
with the equilibrium where they do not): (1) the number of firms is higher; (2) the 
aggregate expenditure on R&D is lower; and (3) the expected date of discovery is 
26 In a series of studies the late Jacob Schmookler (1962) emphasized the influence of the 
growth in demand for a product on innovative activity in the industry in question. The foregoing 
result in the text is a theoretical confirmation of the kind of relationship with which Schmookler 
was concerned. 
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more remote. The loss from the inefficiency in the scale of operation of each 
research laboratory more than offsets the gains from the increased number of 
research laboratories.27 It is straightforward to combine these results with 
those obtained earlier to contrast the market equilibrium with the socially 
optimal number of research firms. 
The results of this section have confirmed the ambiguity noted in the 
previous section: there is no clear presumption whether, with an infinite-lived 
patent in markets with free entry into R&D, there will be excessive or 
inadequate research. In those cases where, with an infinite-lived patent, there 
is excessive expenditure on R&D, there is an optimal patent life for each 
industry and for each invention which will guarantee that the market will 
undertake the correct amount of research; the optimal life of the patent will, 
however, vary depending on the size of invention and the elasticity of demand 
in the industry. Thus, there is no simple intervention into the market allocation 
-no uniform rule applicable for all inventions and industries-which will 
attain the social optimum. Moreover, if firms take into account their effect 
on the aggregate probability distribution of discovery dates (whether it is 
plausible that they will presumably depend on the number of researchers), then, 
even for a particular invention for a particular industry, an optimal patent life 
will not ensure the attainment of the social optimum, since each research 
laboratory will be operated at an inefficiently small scale. A first-best 
optimum may be hypothetically attainable, however, by joining franchise taxes 
or other tax instruments with an optimum patent life. 
5. Speed of research under uncertainty-a generalization 
* The stochastic specification of the research process in the previous section 
had one extremely unattractive feature about it: the Poisson process does not 
allow one to vary the riskiness of the research process without at the same time 
varying the mean time of arrival. One would like to know, for instance, whether, 
when the mean time of arrival among a set of research projects is kept constant, 
the market has a bias for riskier projects. 
In this section we formulate a simple model to address ourselves to that 
and a number of other questions. We characterize the "common" state of 
knowledge at time 0 as having a value of, say, AO. Ao can be thought of as the 
magnitude of the size of hurdles that have to be overcome to make commercially 
27 Substituting the zero-profit condition in (35), we obtain 
from which we can solve for Xe. Since the zero-profit constraint implies 
n Ve _ 
r 
x X 
dn _ Ve +r X' O 
dx x2 A2 
at least for large n. Moreover, 
dnx r >0 
dx A A 
dn X _ e 
dx= e (A - > 0. 
dx x xJ 
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viable whatever it is which is desired. Research consists of solving a large 
number of small problems, each of which when solved reduces the value of A. 28 
Not infrequently, however, something that was not thought to be a problem 
turns out to be a problem-a "set-back," as it is commonly described. This 
can be thought of as an increase in A, in the set of hurdles yet to be overcome. 
Finally, if enough set-backs occur (A becomes large enough), one views this 
line of research as being unfruitful, and one starts over again. 
A simple way of specifying the above process stochastically is as a diffusion 
process. 0 is the absorbing barrier, interpreted as "discovery," and A is a 
reflecting barrier, leading to the firm's undertaking a new line of attack.29 
Analytically, then, our problem lies in characterizing, for any particular 
diffusion process, the distribution of first passage times fromA to 0. We shall begin 
by treating the number of research units as exogenously given. Subsequently, we 
shall allow the number of research units to be endogenously determined. 
First, consider a competitive market in R&D. Suppose that there are 
N(-2) laboratories (firms) working independently of one another. To simplify 
assume them to be identical. Let h(t, a) be the density function of first passages 
for research program a, and let H(t, a) fI h(r, a)d-r be the cumulative 
function. As before, we denote by Ve the capitalized value of a successful 
research program to the firm. It follows that the expected discounted value 
of the research program a to the representative firm is 
00 
Ve e-rth(t, a)( - H(t, a))Nldt. 
(h is the probability he discovers it at t, (1 - H)N-1 is the probability that none 
of his rivals discovers it before t.) Therefore, at a market equilibrium the 
representative firm chooses a so that 
00 
e-rtth.(t,a)(I - H(t, a))N-ldt = 0. (36) 
Suppose, instead, that these N firms are socially managed. Let V, be the 
capitalized social value of a successful research program. 
The probability that, if there are N independent research laboratories, 
the invention will be discovered at date t is 
Nh(l - H)N-1, 
so the present discounted value of the "research program" is 
Ws = VsN e-rth(l - H)Nldt. (37) 
Thus, the planner will choose a so that 
____ = VSNT e rt[ho(t, a)(l - HI(t, a))Nl - h(t, a)(N - 1) 
Ho(t,a)(1 - H(t,a))N-22]dt = 0. (38) 
28 The distance A is perhaps best viewed as the "subjective" perception of the distance 
to discovery. 
29 For a fuller development of the mathematics underlying this diffusion model, see Brock, 
Rothschild, and Stiglitz (1979). 
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As we are attempting to locate the extent to which the market selects risky 
research projects, suppose that the choice is being made from among a family 
of stochastic processes with the same expected date of discovery, i.e., 
00 
th(t,a)dt = constant. 
Let an increase in a represent a mean preserving spread in the distribution 
h(t,a); i.e., 
{ Hc,(r,a)dr ? 0 for all t > 0;30 (39) 
HO(-r,a#)dr = 0. (39a) 
We assume, moreover, for all a in the relevant region, 
H(0,a) = 0, H(oo,a) = 1. (40) 
We now prove that the market equilibrium choice of a is optimal only 
if r = 0; if r > 0, welfare can always be increased by increasing a from the 
market equilibrium. 
To see this we integrate (36) by parts and use (39a) to obtain 
e-rt[(N - 1)h + r(1 - H)]H,(1 - H)N-2dt = 0. (36a) 
Integrating the second term in (36a) by parts again and using (39a), we obtain 
{ e-rtH,(1 H)N-dt 
o~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
= |17 Lf HadT] [(N - 1)h + r(1 - H)]e-r(1 - H)N-2dt. (41) 
Substituting (36), (36a), and (41) into (38) and letting a = ae denote the market 
value of a, we obtain 
(OaS)e0= = rV8N J [{ Hodr1[(N - 1)h + r(1 - H)](1 - H)N-2e-rtdt 
_0 as r _ O. (42) 
Thus, if r = 0, the market equilibrium is (at least locally) optimal; while if 
r > 0, an increase in a (representing an increase in risk taking) will improve 
social welfare.3' 
30 More risky research projects have a greater chance of obtaining results quickly, but also 
a greater chance of complete failure (or of obtaining results in a very long time). The following 
example may help the reader to visualize this. Consider the research process as a discrete random 
walk. A research program is a sequence of experiments. The outcome of any experiment is either 
to bring one closer to one's goal, or to yield no information at all. A big experiment carries 
one forward "two steps," but has a higher probability of failure, while a small experiment carries 
one forward only "one step." Thus, the minimum time to success for the risky research program 
is half that for the other (if all experiments are successful). On the other hand, there is a higher 
probability of having a long sequence of unsuccessful experiments. 
31 Since W8 is not, in general, a well-behaved concave function, it is possible that the 
global optimum involves less risk taking. 
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It is important o observe that although we have limited each firm to a choice 
of research strategies with the same mean time of discovery, the mean time 
of discovery for the aggregate is not invariant to the choice of a; for simplicity, 
we consider only the case of N = 2, where we have successively integrated 
by parts and made use of (39): 
T' =2 { th(I - H)dt (43) 
dT 
-= 2 t[ho(l - H) - hHo]dt 
dcxa 
=-2 { [Ho-t (Hh, + hHo)dr1dt 
= 2 HHOLdt 
= -2 h[{ Hdr1dt < O. (44) 
Thus, mean time to discovery is slower in the market economy than is 
socially optimal. 
We designed the foregoing analysis to study the nature of risk taking when 
both the competitive market and the socially managed one have the same 
exogenously given number of research laboratories. We now allow N to 
be endogenous. Suppose then that F denotes the "fixed cost" in establishing 
a laboratory. 
Clearly, now 
ws = NVS e-rth(1 - H)Nldt - FN. (45) 
Differentiating with respect to N, we obtain 




+ NVs j e-rth(l - H)N-1 ln (1 - H)dt - F = 0. (46) 
With free entry, the market equilibrium is characterized by the number 
of firms, Nc, being a solution of 
00 
Ve e-rth(t,a)(l - H(t,a))N-ldt = F. (47) 
Comparing (46) and (47), we find that the number of firms in market 
equilibrium may be excessive or insufficient. There are three effects: 
(1) The market does not usually appropriate all the returns to research, i.e., 
Ve < Vs; this leads to the market's having an insufficient number of firms. 
(2) f e -rth (I - H)Nf-1 In (I - H)dt < O. (Since H c1, In I - H c-:: 0.) The 
social planner takes into account the reduction in returns to other firms' 
research from the addition of an additional research laboratory; the market 
ignores this effect. (This is just the application to this model of the observation, 
made in the previous section, that in market equilibrium with free entry 
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average returns are equated to average costs; social optimality requires marginal 
returns equal marginal costs. Since marginal returns are less than average 
returns, there is a tendency in the market economy for an excessive number 
of research firms.) 
(3) The uncoordinated choice of research strategies (here reflected in the fact 
that ae < a,) leads to a lower value of the research program in the market 
equilibrium relative to the social optimum, even if there is appropriability of 
the returns from invention. This effect tends to reduce the number of firms 
relative to the social optimum.32 
In contrast to these results, it should be observed that a monopolist 
controlling all the research laboratories would always make the socially efficient 
choice of techniques (am, = a8). But since Vm < Vs, the number of research 
laboratories set up by the monopolist would be unambiguously smaller than is 
socially optimal. Thus, the mean time for the invention to occur is longer 
with the monopolist than is socially optimal. 
6. Concluding remarks 
* In this paper we have attempted to study the nature and consequences 
of competition in R&D and the relationship between this form of competition 
and competition in the product market. Earlier discussions which were directed 
at ascertaining whether monopoly leads to more research than competition, or 
whether there would be insufficient or excessive research in competitive 
environments relative to the social optimum were limited in two critical 
respects: they failed to distinguish between competition in the present product 
market and competition in R&D, and they failed to recognize that the market 
structure was itself an endogenous variable. In this paper, we have focused 
on four questions: 
(1) If there is competition in R&D, what is the effect of the present market 
structure (competition at the present time in the product market) on R&D 
activity? Here we have shown that if the present market is dominated by 
a monopolist, there is likely to be more R&D than when the present market 
structure is competitive; the reason is simply that in the postinvention market, 
there will be, as a result, less competition, and therefore more profits. 
(2) What is the effect of competition in R&D on the level of research? Here, 
we have shown that competition always leads to more research than in a pure 
monopoly; indeed, because with free entry expected average returns must equal 
average costs, even with partial appropriation of returns, competition may 
result in excessive expenditures on R&D relative to the social optimum. 
(3) Over time, how does competition in R&D affect competition in the product 
market? That is, if there are no barriers to entry in the R&D activity, will 
competition in R&D not lead to entry of new firms into the product market, 
thereby ensuring that monopolies will only be short-lived? Our analysis has 
shown how, under certain conditions, a monopoly may persist: if the R&D 
32 However, if the government cannot alter the market's choice of a, whether the government 
would wish to increase or decrease the number of research units (say by taxing a subsidiary F) would 
depend only on the first two effects. 
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technology is also available to the present monopolist in the product market, 
he can (and will) deter entry, e.g., by engaging in sufficiently fast research 
that it does not pay any other entrant to engage in any R&D. Under these 
circumstances monopolies will not be short-lived, although the threat of compe- 
tition may lead the monopolist to engage in significantly faster research than 
he otherwise would. 
Thus, the potentiality of competition may have important effects, even 
when, in any market situation, no competitor is actually observed. (This is, 
of course, related to the well-known observation that the number of firms in 
an industry or the distribution of output among those firms may not be a good 
measure of the degree of competitiveness within the industry; at the extreme, 
in the model of Section 3 where research was nonstochastic only a single firm 
would ever engage in a particular R&D activity at a time.) 
In the models of Section 3 increased expenditures by any single firm 
simply translated into an earlier date of discovery-more research and faster 
research are equivalent. There is in these models no uncertainty (or if there 
is uncertainty, it is of a particularly simple form; there is a single research 
strategy available to all firms). The social return to faster research is the increased 
value (in present discounted terms) of having the invention at t - A? rather 
than at t. The private return, however, is the entire value of the patent, if the 
individual makes the discovery. In the nonstochastic models the social and 
private payoffs to a researcher who does research at a slightly slower pace 
than the fastest researcher are zero: the former's effort is purely wasted dupli- 
cation, and society provides no rewards. This is not so if the research out- 
comes are not perfectly correlated. 
(4) What determines the number of firms (laboratories) engaged in R&D at 
any time? Here, we have noted the critical role played by uncertainty in out- 
comes: if there were no uncertainty, there would only be a single firm; with 
uncertainty, there may be several. (More precisely, what appears to be critical 
is the correlation between the research strategies pursued by different firms. 
In this paper, we have explored two polar cases, where their outcomes are 
perfectly correlated, and where they are independently distributed. As we have 
emphasized, the degree of correlation itself ought to be viewed as the endoge- 
nous variable; this is a question which we hope to pursue elsewhere.) 
We have, moreover, contrasted the number of firms that would emerge in a 
competitive market equilibrium with the socially optimal number of research 
units. With imperfectly correlated returns to R&D, the marginal social return to 
each research unit is positive, but the marginal return is less than the average 
return. In market equilibrium the (average) private return equals the costs of a 
laboratory, while optimality equates marginal social return to the marginal cost 
of a laboratory. Thus, whether there is an insufficient or an excessive number of 
research units depends critically on the elasticity of demand, which determines 
the ratio of the private profits to social returns as well as the size of the inven- 
tion.33 Moreover, we have shown that each of the research units will operate at 
an efficient intensity if there are enough firms that each ignores its effect on the 
probability distribution of discovery dates. If, however, firms do not ignore this 
effect, each laboratory will operate at an inefficient intensity. 
33 This is so when the elasticity is constant, which is a critical assumption (c.f. Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977) for a discussion, in a slightly different context, of how the analysis is altered when 
elasticities are not constant). 
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The market equilibrium may differ from the socially optimal not only in the 
number of research laboratories, but also in the riskiness of projects under- 
taken.34 Here, we have noted a systematic bias in favor of too little risk 
provided that the market rate of interest is greater than zero. In contrast, a 
monopolist always operates each research laboratory efficiently (both with 
respect to scale and choice of risk), but will, in general, have too few 
research laboratories. 
The question, therefore, of whether restricted competition leads to more 
research than free competition is truly complex. On the one hand, it is clear 
that without some method of appropriating returns some degree of monopoly 
power, as represented, e.g., by patents-no firm would engage in R&D. On the 
other hand, competition in R&D may stimulate R&D expenditures, but the 
pattern of expenditures will be less efficient than with a monopoly. Thus, it 
is possible that the date of discovery may be later with competition than 
with monopoly.35 Although there is a strong presumption that monopolies will 
inadequately fund R&D, it is possible that in competitive markets (with patent 
rights) there may be excessive expenditures. 
Finally, the belief that competition in R&D is a substitute for competition 
in the product market, or that it will eventually give rise to competition in the 
product market, has been shown to be suspect: there are conditions under 
which monopolies may persist even without any formal barriers to entry other 
than those provided by the patent system (or by the lags in dissemination 
of information.) 
At the very least, we hope we have convinced the reader that in those 
sectors of the economy where technological change is important, the analysis 
of competitive market equilibrium within the framework provided by the 
traditional competitive equilibrium (e.g., Arrow-Debreu) model is of limited 
applicability: competition in R&D necessitates imperfect competition in product 
markets. This form of competition requires a fundamentally different kind 
of analysis. 
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